



19th REPORT TO CONGRESS

July - December 31, 1962

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U.S. INFORMATION AGENCY
Washington, D.C.

TO: The Honorable
the President of the Senate
The Honorable
the Speaker of the House of Representatives

SIRS:

In the last half of calendar year 1962, the U.S. Information Agency made significant contributions in support of U.S. policies in the Cuban crisis, the challenge of space, and the continuing problems of Free Berlin and nuclear testing.

U.S. policies and actions in the Cuban Affair, and the evidence on which they were based, were thoroughly documented for foreign audiences everywhere in the world.

This was done by heavy use of all communications media and concentration by our posts abroad on local placement and face-to-face persuasion. It included round-the-clock broadcasting in Spanish to Cuba and Latin America, the first use of commercial U.S. stations to supplement our own transmitters, and the first tactical employment of a USIA air-transportable 50-kilowatt transmitter, operating off the tip of Florida.

Continuing intense coverage of space events, particularly Telstar, did much to improve our public position in the space race.

The first half of the 4,800-kilowatt Greenville, N.C., shortwave transmitter complex went on the air in December. When it reaches full power early this year, it will have doubled the previous short-wave capacity of the Voice of America.

Sincerely,



EDWARD R. MURROW, Director.

CUBA: CHALLENGE AND RECOIL

In an unprecedented communications effort, the U.S. Information Agency reached out to an overseas audience in the hundreds of millions to document the American position on the secret Soviet missile buildup in Cuba.

For many months before the Cuban situation reached a critical stage, USIA had been exposing the full story of Castro's sordid sell-out to communism. By films, television, exhibits, press and periodicals, radio broadcasts, lectures and libraries, USIS * posts in over 100 countries had been documenting the debacle in Cuba and generating support for the Alliance for Progress as the most effective antidote to communism and chaos in the Western Hemisphere.

As soon as the White House announced on October 22 that the President would address the Nation that evening, the Agency's radio service, *Voice of America*, began alerting its audiences to be ready for the speech. The speech was carried live from the White House worldwide, with translations in Spanish and Portuguese beamed immediately afterward to Latin America. Throughout the following 24 hours the President's speech was repeated in English and 37 other languages in programs to all parts of the world and timed to reach audiences at peak listening periods.

To insure a maximum Cuban audience for the President's words, private radio stations in the United States linked up with *VOA* for the first time in history, carrying programs fed direct via land-lines from USIA studios in Washington. Eight standard-wave and two short-wave private stations carried the Spanish-language programs nightly from dusk to dawn.

The standard-wave stations included WGBS, WMIE and WCKR in Miami; WSB, Atlanta; WCKY, Cincinnati; WKWF, Key West; WWL, New Orleans and KAAY, Little Rock. Two short-wave stations, WRUL in New York and KGEI in San Carlos, Calif., added their facilities.

Within days, a 50-kilowatt air-transportable USIA transmitter had been installed at Marathon in the Florida Keys and was relaying on standard-wave, around the clock, *Voice of America* programs to the people of Cuba. A 50-kilowatt U.S. Navy transmitter was also set up on Tortuga Key to amplify the signal to Cuba. This added power permitted the commercial stations, after 4 weeks of voluntary public service during the national urgency, to return to their regular programming.

Voice of America increased from 5 to 11 the frequencies carrying Spanish-language programs and tripled its broadcast schedule to 24 hours a day. *VOA* also beamed the President's address and subsequent news stories in Russian to Cuba for Soviet technicians there. English-language broadcasts to Cuba and Latin America were beamed over 6 frequencies instead of the previous 4.

*USIA overseas is known as USIS (United States Information Service).

material weekly to hundreds of stations throughout Latin America for rebroadcast on standard-wave, reaching a far greater audience with the American message than it is possible by short-wave broadcasts alone.

Videotapes of the President's address with overlay translations in Spanish and Portuguese were air-expressed to those countries in Latin America that use television videotape. Similar tapes and kinescopes, narrated in other languages, were dispatched to Agency posts in other areas of the world for television placement.

Two hundred prints of a film of the speech, in many languages, were air-shipped to Agency posts in over 100 countries for theatrical and non-theatrical showing, for screenings at USIA information centers, and for showing over local television stations and networks. A 6-minute film clip of highlights was sent to posts for relay to newsreel companies for commercial showing abroad.

As the President spoke on October 22, 107 Agency posts overseas were receiving the full text by USIA radio teletype. The text was quickly translated and reproduced for delivery to local government officials and newspaper editors. The latter were thus able to carry the text in their next editions. Translations of the speech were also telexed to overseas posts in French, Portuguese, and Spanish. This rapid service made it possible for hundreds of leading papers around the world to print the full text of the President's speech in their own languages.

During the first critical week the Agency air-shipped over 50,000 prints of photographs to 225 posts abroad together with copy negatives and plastic plates ready for printing. These pictures—including Department of Defense aerial reconnaissance photos of the Cuban missile sites—were published in newspapers and periodicals around the world. They documented the U.S. position and provided visual background for understanding the causes of the Cuban crisis. Enlargements were shown as window displays in USIA information centers and at many other public places in 102 countries.

Koreans in Seoul crowd to see USIS window displays depicting Cuban crisis.





In Dacca, East Pakistan, passersby are acquainted with secret Soviet move.

For TV viewers in Latin America, within 4 days the Agency had sent 30 prints each of the following programs: A 6-minute commentary on the situation; special report on the OAS meeting; Secretary Dillon's address to economic ministers meeting at Mexico City; Secretary Dillon reading the President's message to the Mexico City meeting; a 20-minute special program on the OAS meeting; Mexico's President speaking on Cuba.

"Telstar" transmission of the President's speech to millions of viewers in Europe October 23 was arranged by USIA. Each evening for a week a 5-minute TV commentary of the day's events was air-shipped to posts overseas. A quarter-hour documentary, "Focus: Cuba," with multilanguage sound tracks was air-expressed abroad. The weekly TV program, "Panorama Panamericano," seen by 12 million people in 42 Latin American cities, repeatedly included highlights of the unfolding crisis.

The commercial television program, "Anatomy of Betrayal," was acquired by USIA from the producer, translated into Spanish and Portuguese, and shown immediately after the telecast of the President's speech to viewers throughout Latin America.


Omissions and distortions in communist propaganda output during the crisis were carefully noted and pointed up in USIA's output, particularly to communist countries. For days after October 22, for example, Soviet newspaper readers were not told by the controlled communist press that nuclear missile sites were under construction in Cuba. Similarly, listeners to Radio Havana were not told that 20 nations of the Organization of American States had unanimously upheld the quarantine actions of the President. Only by means of *VOA* and other Free World broadcasts were the Russian and Cuban people able to learn the truth of unfolding events.

On October 25 *VOA* massed 52 transmitters strategically sited around the Soviet Union to broadcast the full story of the Cuban crisis to the USSR and the captive people of East Europe, denied the truth by communist censor-

as many as 80 frequencies in 10 languages. The electronic barrage was favored by good propagation and broke through the massive communist jamming effort.

The truth barrage was made to supplement regular *VOA* programing to the area. Electronic monitoring and the reports of American newsmen in Moscow confirmed that the broadcasts, despite Soviet jamming efforts, were highly successful.

An illustrated pamphlet with the text of the President's address was published by the Agency's overseas printing plants and was widely distributed in many languages. A photo exhibit, in 100 copies, went to Latin America. Prints in 10 languages of a 10-minute film documentary backgrounding the Cuban situation were air-shipped worldwide.



A 50-kw. air-transportable radio transmitter was set up in southern Florida.

Another film documentary, including interviews with recently-arrived Cuban refugees who had witnessed the secret Soviet military buildup on the island, was rushed to overseas posts for showing on television.

The President's follow-up press conference on November 20 was carried live over the *Voice of America's* worldwide English service and with simultaneous translations over the Spanish and Portuguese services. It was afterwards broadcast in the *Voice's* 35 other languages at peak listening times around the world. The full text of his remarks on Cuba was flashed to USIS posts in over a hundred countries by radio-teletype for quick translation and distribution to key officials and editors.

Overseas reaction to the Cuban crisis as reported by USIS posts:

Correa de la Tarde, Buenos Aires: "Americans heard their own voice from the lips of the President of the United States . . . We are being attacked, the United States position is our position. Not to stand by the United States and all our brothers of the Americas is to side with Moscow."

the Cuban crisis:

Bangkok: "... kept an unprecedented flow of materials going to editors' desks that contributed greatly to Thai understanding of the U.S. position. Press coverage extremely heavy. The crisis drew a total of 26 editorials supporting the U.S. in the first 10 days . . ."

Ankara: "The Turkish newspaper, *Son Havadis*, wrote: 'Imagine the perfection of an organization that could translate Kennedy's statement into Turkish and publish it in the form of a beautiful brochure the same day, distributing it to newspapers and prominent writers in Istanbul'."

Caracas: Our film describing Soviet missile bases in Cuba was televised nationwide over the top-rated news show, the *Observador Creole*. An audience estimated at well over 1 million saw the program . . . it came through with great impact."

Quito: "... Cesar Cano, our film operator, was in the northern Sierra region. Monitoring the *VOA* Spanish transmissions, he heard the alert on the President's upcoming broadcast. He quickly moved his mobile unit to the church in the center of this large but isolated town, installed loud speakers in the steeple, connected his radio to the mobile unit's amplifier and 'rebroadcast' the *VOA* Spanish transmission of the President's message to an assembled audience of more than 2,000. This was the only way that a large group of people could hear the President as there is no electricity or radio in this village."

Karachi: "Our weekly magazine went into daily production to disseminate the wireless file material and we stepped up individual mailings from 6,500 copies to 45,000 to reach all important categories of Pakistani readers."

Lome, Republic of Togo: "We ran off 2,500 copies of the President's speech in French and distributed them with our weekly as a special supplement. We afterwards found it necessary to issue a second and third special supplement."

Tehran: "We reproduced and distributed 500 English copies and 2,000 Farsi copies of the President's address . . . and 2,000 Farsi copies of Ambassador Stevenson's address at the U.N. . . . Distributed a 4-page pamphlet entitled 'The Free World Supports U.S. Cuban Policy' to 1,200 Iranian leaders."

Djakarta: "Received the Kennedy speech text at 8 a.m. October 23. and within an hour had distributed copies to wire services, afternoon papers, and Government officials. The *Observer* and *Sinar Harapan*, first papers to break the story that afternoon, depended exclusively on USIS for front page copy. Both the *PIA* and *Antara* news services used full USIS coverage from the wireless file . . . Eight of 12 dailies, including the Communist press, used our texts and releases . . ."

ance to an on the American continent . . . It was impossible for Washington authorities to allow Cuba to become a base for 'nuclear attack' . . ."

Daily Express, London: "The full extent of the menace which Cuba has become is dramatically exposed by the American photos. These enormously strengthen the U.S. case--and the urgent need to end this situation."

La Nacion, Santiago, credited the diversion of Soviet ships from Cuba to "the determined attitude of the United States to contain, at whatever price, and once for all, Soviet penetration into American territory."

Halkin Sesi, Nicosia, Cyprus, called the American decision on an arms quarantine of Cuba, "a stand which can provide good results for all Free World countries."



Executives of private U.S. radio stations are thanked for help by President.

CDU Press Service, Bonn: ". . . The President has shown by patience and constructive proposals his desire for peace. The readiness to negotiate exists now, as before. The German people understand Kennedy's determination and agree with him entirely."

The Herald, Manila: "In boldly announcing the steps the U.S. has initiated . . . President Kennedy could not have taken a more logical posture. Indeed, it is a stand that the U.S. must make if it is to keep the Free World security . . . strong and intact."

Ege Ekspres, Izmir, Turkey: "The dynamic U.S. President, realizing the fact that the longer this matter dragged on the more harmful it could become, took immediate action . . ."

Catholic de Volksrant, The Hague: ". . . President Kennedy cited new developments which lend a very critical character to the situation in the Caribbean area, which is not only a danger to the U.S. but to us . . ."

naturally supported him."

Il Messagero, Rome: "The President's speech was firm and resolute as the situation demands; the decision indicates a lofty sense of responsibility and confidence in the United Nations . . ."

To gain understanding and support overseas for the U.S. position during the Cuban crisis, these are the basic points made by USIA in output through all its media:

- The USSR and the Castro regime, which betrayed the revolution and sold out Cuba as a satellite of the Soviet Union, bear entire responsibility for the crisis resulting from the secret Soviet military build-up in Cuba,

- The U.S. acted swiftly, firmly, and decisively to protect the security of the Western Hemisphere and the peace of the world. The action announced October 22 by President Kennedy followed a week of intensive deliberation and planning. The U.S. steps, aimed at achieving a peaceful solution of the crisis, were decided upon in an atmosphere of calm and determination.


- The issue was simple: secretly and under cover of deceitful and fervent protestations to the contrary by Soviet and Cuban leaders, the USSR had swiftly been constructing offensive nuclear missile sites in Cuba. The new, unmistakably offensive, mass-destruction weapons threatened the safety of the entire Western Hemisphere and the peace of the world.

- The Soviet missile bases in Cuba were the first offensive nuclear installations built, supplied and manned by the USSR outside the Soviet Union. They were totally different in conception and purpose from the NATO bases in Turkey and Italy which are not secret and are entirely defensive.

- The U.S. quarantine of Cuba was limited to keeping offensive weapons out of the island; not food, medicine, or other civilian supplies. Nor was the quarantine aimed against the Cuban people, who have the full sympathy of the American people and whose revolution was betrayed by the self-confessed communist puppet, Castro.

- U.S. commitments to Free Berlin and to our allies around the world were not related to or affected by the Cuban crisis. U.S. actions, moreover, were promptly and unanimously supported by all governments of the Americas and by our allies overseas.

- As the missile sites were dismantled, USIA output stressed that the removal of the bases was no cause for complacency, for gloating or smug satisfaction. Other urgent problems—the communist threat to Berlin, the proliferation of nuclear weapons, a nuclear test ban treaty, disarmament, communist aggression against India and Viet Nam—remained to be settled.



Giant VOA antennas nearing completion at Greenville, in North Carolina.

on the continent."

Sunday Times, London: "... President Kennedy's statesmanship may well go down in history as the turning point in our long struggle to preserve something of the values which western civilization stands for."

The *Times* Peking correspondent noted that the Chinese communists, ebullient during the first week of the crisis, now felt "left out in the cold because of Khrushchev's backdown over Cuba and the strong Western support shown for India . . ."

L'Aurore, Paris: "For Khrushchev there is an historic role he could readily choose, which would consist of simply ceasing to play the game of war blackmail."

Kampala, Uganda: The Prime Minister at a press conference said, "If you should begin to quarrel for example with Zanzibar and all of a sudden there were dangerous weapons in Zanzibar pointed at Kenya and Uganda, what could you do? You could not just sit there. The greatest danger is to do nothing. I agree with the President." *Eyogera*, a Uganda newspaper, commented that the United States "would be failing in its duty not to stop a hostile country from piling up offensive weapons in a country within a stone's throw . . ."

El Telegrafo, Ecuador: "It is the sentiment of the peoples of America that Washington has exercised patience to the very limits of human endurance . . . Faced with the Cuban situation, the United States has a responsibility for the defense of the continent and has adopted methods that all the Americas can but approve and support."

Le Progres, Leopoldville, Republic of Congo: "It has been clear for some months now that Soviet imperialism has intended to advance as far as possible in the Caribbean without provoking a major crisis. The Free World should unite without hesitation against this new Soviet aggression. Remember the lesson of Hitler: the price one may be called on to pay tomorrow may be a thousand times greater than the cost of firmness today."

Monrovia, Liberia: President Tubman said at a press conference, "The United States is perfectly justified in the interest of its proper security in establishing a quarantine . . . If a similar situation presented itself in any other country, then a similar action would be justified . . ."

Mainichi, Tokyo: "... The present crisis was precipitated because the leaders of the Soviet Union, despite repeated assertions that they would not send offensive weapons to Cuba, actually began sending intermediate ballistic missiles and strategic bombers, which are clearly offensive weapons . . . If the Soviet Union continues this provocative action, the majority of world opinion would severely criticize . . ."